20 Years after Dayton – How the Peace Accords thwarted the Genesis of a Common Bosnian Identity
December 14, 2015 symbolises a remarkable anniversary: Twenty years ago, the signatures of Slobodan Milošević, Franjo Tuđjman and Alija Izetbegović to the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) terminated the war, which had been tearing apart Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosna i Hercegovina, BiH) since 1992, and which was the bloodiest conflict on European soil since World War II. That day also inaugurated the era of international influence and presence in the country, which has been ongoing until today. For the past two decades, the international community has been supporting the country’s ambitions to transform from war to sustainable peace, stability, and security, while simultaneously creating a viable democratic state. However, twenty years later seems to be an appropriate time to examine the relationship between the Accords and the country’s current situation.
In eleven annexes, the DPA regulated the conflict’s aftermath and formulated the basic principles of the cease-fire and the military and civil post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation of BiH. Most importantly, the accords aimed at safeguarding the continuous existence of the state itself, in its internationally recognised borders, while assuring the cessation of violent hostilities. Certainly, the DPA led to major achievements: the fighting was terminated, consequences of a humanitarian catastrophe resolved, the basics for a constitutional structure laid, and at the same time the Accords united the contrasting interests of warring parties within an extreme complicated structure. However, unvarnished soberness is essential: the ethno-national partition of BiH basically accepted the ethnic cleansing, and this imposed structure hinders the state from functioning. It should be a tocsin that the structural deficits of Dayton have not yet been overcome and are creating hurdles along the way, which might straightforwardly turn into permanent holdbacks and jeopardise the survival of BiH as a state.
State-building measures such as the state and institutional structures, the electoral system, reconciliation methods, the High Representative and the organisation of political parties, challenge BiH’s inhabitants towards acquiring a common understanding as ‘Bosnian’. The strict prerequisites inscribed in the Accords and the constant international interference into the political process have prevented identification with and legitimacy towards the young state of BiH. Political participation requires indicating ethnical belonging rather than affiliation with civic values. The Accords have cemented an ‘identity via ethnicity’ by engraving Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs as the only constituent peoples. Hence, the so-called ‘Others’ (recognised minorities, and Bosnians who refuse to ascribe to one of the three constituent peoples) are excluded from partaking in political life.
Everything in BiH is centred around ethnicity, resulting in a continuation of war categories, the discrimination of minorities and a lack of shared perspectives towards the future. The equality and balance of participatory rights of different groups were key aspects of the DPA in order to generate unity. After the war, the international community tried to compensate for its prior omissions by taking a strong grip on the country, aiming to create an effective state with functioning institutions to enable the continued existence of BiH as a nation of all Bosnian citizens. Particularly during the DPA’s composition, however, little attention was paid to the fact that BiH is a unique country, which has been influenced by a diversity of regimes and cultural streams. Its citizens share traditions and history preceding the war, which needs to be considered in the country’s transition processes from war to peace, from communism to capitalism, and ethno-nationalism to a multi-faceted democracy. However, the last step’s execution can rightly be questioned as ethno-national political elites still dominate political (and economic) life, and the constant categorisation and demand to identify with one of the three constituent peoples prevent Bosnians from ‘moving on’, and forming an identity outside ethnic clustering. Most Bosnians are not interested in political participation, the constant deadlocks and stagnation have steered dissatisfaction.
By placing ethnicity in the foreground of all parts of Bosnians’ life, and thus structuring their choices, for example regarding political parties and education facilities, the possibility for an identity transgressing ethnical borders and an orientation along classifications, such as socio-economic status, gender, occupation, and civic values, was eliminated. Therefore, BiH has shown that imposed identity formation has the opposite of the desired effects – a lack of nationhood and acknowledgement of the state. The international community should be encouraged to cede responsibility and thus to allow authentic local ownership of the Bosnian citizens for self-determining their future. Bosnians still face numerous challenges, among them steps such as strengthening the central state’s authority and implementing necessary changes, particularly in the field of the election law and education policies, guaranteeing minority representation, boosting civil society to allow reinforcement of civic values, and encouraging development of a national identity regardless of ethnical identification. It is essential to create equal opportunities for all citizens regardless of how they identify, and to overcome discriminatory regulations, which violate European and International Law. Eliminating the structuring of choices regarding political parties or education, which polarise and deepen nationalistic orientations among the post-war generation, might help constraining growing migration, particularly of young and well-educated, but frustrated Bosnians, and therefore prevent losing the country’s future potential. Reforming the institutional design and election system would, firstly, encourage political elites to address potential voters from all ethnical backgrounds, and then stimulate citizens to transgress ethnical borders, and secondly, create more legitimacy, hence strengthening the federal institutions’ effectiveness.
Reforms and modifications, however, need to be initiated from within BiH. Positive examples such as the multi-ethnical army, the successful administration of Brčko, and the ‘Plenum-Movement’, have shown the potential of the country and its citizens. To effectively master the different transition processes, for Bosnians to define their national identity in own terms, and to determine their future themselves, ownership is crucial. Otherwise the dependency on the international community will not be overcome. However, the international community should not cut all ties, but rather offer guidance and support if required. After all, an international experiment resulted in the current state of BiH.
Photo Credit: Wikimedia
